How might Democratisation Affect Military Professionalism in Africa? Reviewing the Literature

The search continues for methods to improve security for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the important actors in this security arena is Sub-Saharan African governments’ armies. Much of their capability to meet security challenge depends on how militarily professional they are. The wave of democratic evolution in Africa since 1990 also affected military professionalism. This article reviews three models for assessing how democratisation might affect military professionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to post-conflict states. This should make it possible to decide which analytical methods are most appropriate to measure military professionalism in the particular circumstances of Sub-Saharan African post-conflict democratisation. Depending upon the particular nation-state in question, this decision on analytical methods may be useful for other Sub-Saharan states as well.     

THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES IN GERMANY

We identify the causal effect of a reduction in military personnel on a number of socioeconomic indicators within the peripheries of military bases. The base realignments and closures in Germany are used as an exogenous source of variation that allows us to identify the effect of a demand shock on household income, output, unemployment, and tax revenue within a specified buffer zone around each base. The analysis covers 298 communities for the period 2003–2007. Consistent with evidence found elsewhere, we find that these base adjustments have only a marginal impact on the local community in which the bases are located.     

A mathematical model for generating the area of a drainage basin

This paper presents a mathematical model that yields the area drained by a naturally-occurring network of streams. The model is based on empirically derived relationships in the field of quantitative geomorphology and an assumption concerning the probabilistic nature of stream system formation. A wide range of model solutions is indicated, and the model is validated by comparing the results to statistics from actual stream systems.     

The Somali National Army: an assessment

To engage properly with the Somali National Army, to understand it in the hope of improving stability and the lives of over 12 million Somalis, good basic information on its composition and characteristics is necessary. Authoritative accounts on the subject have been scarce for over 25 years. This account seeks to detail the army’s dispositions across southern Somalia, and, more importantly, the brigades’ clan compositions and linkages. Clan ties supersede loyalties to the central government. The army as it stands is a collection of former militias which suffer from ill-discipline and commit crime along with greater atrocities. Estimates of numbers are unreliable, but there might be 13,000 or more fighters in six brigades in the Mogadishu area and five beyond.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Glimpse into an army at its peak: notes on the Somali National Army in the 1960–80s

ABSTRACT

Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham correctly argue that the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official security institutions in Africa have been somewhat neglected, with a lack of much recent research. The Somali National Army (SNA) sits among these lacunae. Its formal structures can be used as a skeletal starting point and springboard to start to draw the network diagrams that chart informal linkages. This is why recent declassification decisions by U.S. intelligence bodies, coupled with period documents released to the UK National Archives, hold significance in helping us understand early hierarchical SNA arrangements. They show the steady build-up in size of the force, to 1987, to about the time the civil war began to fragment the state.     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.